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Freedom, Equality, and Conflict: Rousseau on Machiavelli 
 
Abstract: Rousseau’s praise for Machiavelli in the Social Contract goes along with his 
condemnation of partial association and political conflicts. Yet Machiavelli builds his theory 
precisely around the idea of the constructive role of conflicts, seeing the irreducible 
multiplicity of the many as the source of a positive conflictuality. Is the ontological primacy 
of Rousseau’s singularity in the general will compatible with the political primacy of 
Machiavelli’s conflictual multiplicity?  By exploring Rousseau’s strategy in his use of 
Machiavelli, I will argue that the key to interpreting the ambiguities of Rousseau’s reading 
lies in the evaluation of the differences in the relationship between multiplicity and 
singularity in both authors. While the people produces an immanent and conflictualistic 
ground for power in Machiavelli, in Rousseau it is subjected to a transcendent process of 




Jean-Jacques Rousseau is ordinarily associated with the cultural and political 
background of the French Revolution. He is also accused of having inspired, malgré lui, the 
ideology and the resulting policies that culminated in the Terror and the 1793 civil war.1 
                                                 
1 For example by H. Arendt, On Revolution (Westport, Conn., 1963). See J.H. Mason, ‘Forced 
to be free’, in R. Wokler (ed.), Rousseau and Liberty (Manchester and New York, 1995), pp. 
121-38. References to Rousseau and Machiavelli employ the following abbreviations: SC and 
DOI: respectively On the Social Contract and Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, trans. D.A. 
Cress, in The Basic Political Writings (Indianapolis-Cambridge, 1987); D: Discourses on Livy, 
trans. H.C. Mansfield and N. Tarcov (Chicago and London, 1996); P: The Prince, ed. Q. 
Skinner and R. Price (Cambridge, 1988); FH: Florentine Histories, trans. L.F. Banfield and H.C. 
Mansfield (Princeton, NJ, 1988). 
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However Maximilien Robespierre’s comments sound an implicit disavowal when he declares 
that ‘the plan for the French Revolution was clearly written in the works of Tacitus and 
Machiavelli,’ without mentioning Rousseau.2 Robespierre is probaby echoing here what had 
already become an established topos, shared by Rousseau himself, namely the so-called 
‘republican interpretation’ of Machiavelli. Machiavelli the monster, Machiavelli the inspirer 
of the worst tyrants on earth had slowly but steadily become Machiavelli the defender of 
freedom and the partisan of free republics.3  
With his authority, Rousseau quickly becomes the most important apologist for 
Machiavelli in the XVIII century. They share several themes, such as the interest in the role 
of the legislator, the effects of culture and education in the progress and decadence of 
societies, the political role of religion, the preference for an army of citizens against an army 
of mercenaries, and so on. Given the growing importance of debate on Republicanism in 
these decades, Machiavelli definitely appears to be one of the main sources for Rousseau. 
And yet a problem – if not a riddle – in the interpretation of their relationship is 
immediately evident for the historian of political thought. Machiavelli is widely recognised as 
the apologist of social and political conflict within a free republic. For him, freedom results 
                                                 
2 M. Robespierre, ‘Sur les principes de morale politique qui doivent guider la Convention 
nationale dans l’administration intérieure de la République’, Oeuvres, ed. by. A. Soboul and M. 
Bouloiseau (Paris, 1958-67), vol. X, pp. 350-66, en. trans. ‘Report on the Principles of 
Political Morality’, Virtue and Terror (London, 2007), p. 109. On Rousseau and the French 
revolution, see J. McDonald, Rousseau and the French Revolution: 1762-1791 (London, 1965), I. 
Fetscher, Rousseaus politische Philosophie (Frankfurt am Main, 1975), pp. 258-304, and R. Barny, 
L’Eclatement revolutionnaire du rousseauisme (Paris, 1988). 
3 Being associated with Tacitus, moreover, is not a new argument. The 1683 influential 
translation of and comment on The Prince by Amelot de la Houssaye had already suggested 
joining the two authors, in the name of political realism and love of freedom. Bayle and 
Diderot, more or less implicitly, share this position. Such a pool of influential opinion 
defuses the strongest-ever ideological attack against the author of The Prince, namely the Anti-
Machiavel of Frederic II and Voltaire. See Frédéric II, roi de Prusse, Anti-Machiavel. Oeuvres 
philosophiques (Paris, 1985). On de la Houssaye, see J. Soll, Publishing the Prince: History, Reading, 
and the Birth of Political Criticism (Ann Arbor, 2005). 
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precisely from conflicts and divisions: between the plebs and the senate in Rome for 
example, as well as between the people and the Grandi in Florence. Rousseau’s comments on 
divisions and political conflicts are also well known: nothing is worse for him than the 
‘partial association’ that might arise within the State, and even the conflictual debates that 
might ordinarily emerge within an assembly are to be feared. The opposition is clear and 
relates to one of the most fundamental problems of political theory, namely the relationship 
between order and conflict. Moreover, Rousseau bitterly criticizes several philosophers, and 
only says good words, in the Social Contract, for the Marquis d’Argenson and Machiavelli. 
And if it was not enough of a puzzle, when Rousseau  praises Machiavelli, he precisely 
makes use of his argument on the positive role played by social conflicts. This puzzle points 
out to one of the most fundamental and yet unexplored questions in the history of early 
modern political thought.4 
Only a few works have been devoted to the comparison between these two authors. 
And although all of them touch upon the issue of conflicts (with a variety of emphasis), 
none of them seem able to offer a solution for Rousseau’s ambiguous statements on 
Machiavelli. I suggest that there are two main reasons for this inability to offer an adequate 
explanation to this problem. The  first is that scholars tend to misinterpret Machiavelli’s own 
defence of political conflict, thus producing an unsatisfactory response to the problem 
represented by Rousseau’s comments on it; the second reason is that they tend to isolate 
Rousseau’s quotations of Machiavelli, failing to consider them in the context of both 
Rousseau’s larger work and the wider political thought of the period. 
                                                 
4 The puzzling aspect of this question, however, is often overlooked by scholars. See, for 
example, C. Mossin, ‘Creation, Destruction, and the Continuity of Order’, in H.R. Lauritsen 
and M. Thorup (eds.), Rousseau and Revolution (London-New York, 2011), p. 145: ‘The 
development of partial societies represents the most serious enemy of society according to 
Rousseau, in agreement with Machiavelli and Hobbes’ [italics mine]. 
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In this article, I am going to show the different approaches Machiavelli and Rousseau 
have to the theory of conflict. Whereas Rousseau considers the many through their 
necessary sublimation in the singularity of the general will and supports the absolute, albeit 
democratic, order that it generates, Machiavelli sees the irreducible multiplicity of the many 
as the source of a positive conflictuality. I will show that Rousseau’s ambiguity is not based 
on a misunderstanding of Machiavelli. On the contrary, Rousseau has understood 
Machiavelli much better than his modern critics have. However,Yet the ontological primacy 
of Rousseau’s general will is incompatible with the political primacy of Machiavelli’s 
conflictual multiplicity. I will support my thesis both by 1) underlining a powerful 
convergence between Machiavelli and Rousseau in texts where the name of Machiavelli is 
not mentioned and that are normally not considered by scholars, and by 2) putting 
Rousseau’s comments on social conflict in the wider intellectual environment of his own 
period. In this background, they will appear less ambiguous than they appear to us. 
Yves Lévy is the first modern scholar who openly engages with the question of 
Machiavelli and Rousseau.5 Lévy maintains that Rousseau has not fully understood  
Machiavelli’s position. Whereas Machiavelli is a realist who accepts  doing only what is  
possible, here and now, Rousseau is an idealist who pursues the perfect project of 
                                                 
5 Y. Lévy, ‘Les parties et la démocratie’, Le contrat social, III (1959), 2, pp. 79-86 and III 
(1959), 4, pp. 217-21 and ‘Machiavel et Rousseau’, Le contrat social, VI (1962), 3, pp. 169-74. 
Before Lévy’s articles, a few attempts had been made to analyse Machiavelli’s influence on 
Rousseau. In his Macchiavel [sic], Montesquieu, Rousseau (Berlin, 1850), J. Venedey had boldly 
maintained that the three authors ‘umfassen in gewisser Beziehung den ganzen Kreis der 
Staatswissenschaft’, respectively representing absolutism, constitutional monarchism, and 
democratic republicanism.Yet Venedey does not really engage in a serious comparative 
analysis of their works. V. Waille directly follows Venedey in his Machiavel en France (Paris, 
1884), but he does not go much further than listing a set of topics commonly shared by the 
philosophers, and arriving at the general conclusion that ‘Rousseau partage […] les opinion 
de Machiavel, dont il diffère par l’humeur rêveuse, par l’amour passionné de la nature, par la 
croyance à l’excellence native de l’homme, et par l’allure oratoire’ (p. 240). 
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democracy. Therefore Rousseau is pushed to follow the classical Platonic and Christian 
tradition of absolute condemnation of every kind of conflict in order to  support the process 
that will lead to the formation of the purest and highest form of will, namely the general one. 
Thus Rousseau misinterprets Machiavelli who, in fact, did only support  certain kind of 
divisions, namely those based on political parties, and blames, like every other author in the 
history of political thought, the conflicts based on factions. Rousseau seems to 
underestimate this distinction, so much that one thinks he is voluntarily misinterpreting 
Machiavelli. But Lévy ultimately shows that this is not the case, and that, by wrongly 
interpreting Machiavelli’s text, Rousseau is in fact creating  a contradiction.   
A few years later, Paolo M. Cucchi offers an interpretation that tries to save 
Rousseau from himself.6 Rousseau has not misinterpreted Machiavelli, according to Cucchi, 
because in fact Machiavelli only ‘seems’ to support social conflict for the benefit of freedom, 
while being very well aware that this system is far from being ‘perfect.’ Moreover, 
Machiavelli does not say that divisions are positive, but merely says that they are not 
negative, and that only organised divisions do not harm the republic.7 These organised 
divisions, therefore, unproblematically correspond to Rousseau’s ‘deliberations’, described in 
Social Contract II,3. When Rousseau quotes the conflictual argument of Machiavelli, he has in 
mind his idea of individual ‘deliberation’. Following a similar pattern, Roger Payot suggests 
that Rousseau has correctly understood Machiavelli, but without really explaining how.8 
Besides the dubious claim that their common membership in the middle-class makes them 
                                                 
6 P.M. Cucchi, ‘Rousseau lecteur de Machiavel’, in M. Launay (éd.), Jean-Jacques Rousseau et son 
temps. Politique et Littérature au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 1969), pp. 17-35. 
7 This is also the conclusion of A. Jourdan, ‘Le Machiavel de Rousseau: Politique et religion’ 
in J. Leerssen and M. Spiering (eds.), Machiavelli: Figure-Reputation, Yearbook of European Studies 
VIII (1996), pp. 63-93. 
8 R. Payot, ‘Jean-Jacques Rousseau et Machiavel’, Les Etudes Philosophiques (1971), pp. 209-23. 
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share an impartial point of view, detached from concrete and particular interests, Payot 
avoids the problem of conflicts9 by saying that Rousseau’s comments are not surprising, and 
they in fact are coherent with Machiavelli’s. 
More interesting are two articles published in the 80s, by Lionel A. McKenzie10 and 
Maurizio Viroli.11 McKenzie’s thesis is that Rousseau’s dialogue with Machiavelli is indeed 
centered on the concept of ‘interests’, which correspond to the ‘humours’ of Machiavelli, 
and therefore point  toward the semantic area of conflicts. However, Rousseau hides his real 
feelings, and instead of openly engaging with his source, he prefers to maintain an exterior 
agreement with Machiavelli, while at the same time rejecting his opinion on the positive 
character of conflicts. McKenzie’s thesis is interesting insofar as it situates Rousseau within a 
complex field of theoretical and historical problems such as the Republican interpretation of 
Rousseau’s political thought, the coherence and relationship of Machiavelli’s different works, 
and the anti-Machiavellian literature of the 18th century. Yet this thesis is also undermined, 
once again, by what is in my view a weak interpretation of Machiavelli’s theory of conflicts. 
Whereas, for McKenzie, Rousseau condemns every group and partial association, 
Machiavelli only condemns factions and is in favour of parties. Rousseau is therefore 
distorting Machiavelli’s real intention, in order to use it on his own account and be able to 
hold his own ambiguous position. 
Claiming the primacy of rhetorics over politics, Viroli mainly focuses on questions of 
language. He maintains that the use of a common Republican vocabulary by the two authors 
                                                 
9 P.M. Vernes, ‘Nicolas Machiavel chez Jean-Jacques Rousseau: des leçons aux rois aux 
leçons aux peuples’, in Actes du colloque franco-italien de philosophie (Paris, 1977), pp. 77-89 also 
takes this tack, and it is therefore irrelevant for the present discussion. 
10 L.A. McKenzie, ‘Rousseau's Debate with Machiavelli in the Social Contract’,  Journal of the 
History of Ideas, XLIII (1982), pp. 209-28. 
11 M. Viroli, ‘Republic and Politics in Machiavelli and Rousseau’, History of Political Thought, X 
(1989), pp. 405-20. 
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is the key to explaining the apparently ambiguous position of Rousseau. Rousseau, according 
to Viroli, only partially supports Machiavelli’s vision. Both, for example, prefer a mixed form 
of government rather than a pure democracy, which should be understood not so much as a 
form of government of the people, but rather as an institutional mechanism allowing the 
people to appoint magistrates and hold public offices.12 When it comes to the question of 
conflict, Viroli re-interprets them not according to Machiavelli’s political position (‘the 
disunion […] made the Republic free and powerful’) but according to the institutional results 
that some laws (and not others) supposedly produce, despite the conflicts, for the common 
good. Conflicts, in this sense, would perform the function of ‘selecting’ good laws (those in 
favour of the common good) over bad laws (those that have a partial and partisan character).  
Consequently, Viroli repeats the moderate mantra that good conflicts characterised 
the history of Rome only before the Agrarian Law while  bad conflicts characterise the later 
history of Rome as well as the whole history of Florence. This could have brought Rousseau 
to interpret at least the positive conflicts as tools to produce a pure form of will. But in fact, 
apparently without an explanation, Rousseau decides to reject every form of conflictuality, 
even the normal dialectic taking place in public assemblies. Therefore, Rousseau sticks to the 
traditional idea of concordia and entirely rejects Machiavelli. Viroli does not give any 
explanation of Rousseau’s seemingly contradictory support of Machiavelli’s conflictual 
position. The similarity doesn’t go much beyond the common use of a Republican 
vocabulary, and Viroli fails to give a serious account of their respective political positions. 
                                                 
12 Besides being based on a dubious interpretation, this thesis is also problematic insofar as 
Rousseau would agree with Machiavelli for a different reason and, most of all, with an 
opposed political goal in mind. If Machiavelli supposedly supported a mixed government 
(which I do not believe), he would have done it in order to make it stronger. Rousseau, on 
the contrary, maintains that, insofar as it is divided, the mixed government is weaker and 
therefore the less dangerous government vis-à-vis the people, the real sovereign. 
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Although with some differences, all the aforementioned scholars share the 
assumption that Machiavelli make a distinction between good and bad conflicts, as well as 
between parties and factions.13 They come to this view by assuming a classical topos of the 
scholarship on Machiavelli, which is to contrast the conflict that precedes the Agrarian Law 
in Rome with both those following the Gracchi reform and those characterising the history 
of Florence.14 In this sense, the Discourses should be opposed to the Florentine Histories, where 
the Machiavellian apology of conflicts, according to this interpretation, is undermined by the 
tragic political history of Florence. The consequence of this interpretation is that Rousseau 
has – wholly or partially – misunderstood Machiavelli and his argument on conflicts. 
Now, in chapter III,6 of the Social Contract, Rousseau develops the following 
argument: 1) a ‘political sermonizer’ should advise the prince to ground his power on the 
people, precisely as Machiavelli does, on the ground that ‘the people’s force is their force’; 2) 
but, against Machiavelli this time, ‘they know perfectly well that this is not true’, because 
ruler’s interest is rather that the people should be ‘weak and miserable and incapable of ever 
resisting them’; 3) therefore, against Machiavelli once again, the prince should think about 
himself and his own utility against that of the people. And here Rousseau famously adds his 
curious statement that ‘Machiavelli has made [this truth] apparent. Under the pretext of 
teaching kings, he has taught important lessons to the peoples. Machiavelli’s The Prince is the 
book of republicans’. In the 1782 edition, Rousseau adds a footnote to further explain this 
idea: ‘Machiavelli was a decent man and a good citizen’. Therefore he could not say all he 
                                                 
13 This is also the conclusion of R.D. Masters, The Political Philosophy of Rousseau (Princeton, 
NJ, 1968) who claims that, on this ground, Rousseau does not rule out a certain kind of 
‘pluralism’ as a ‘necessary fact of political life’ (p. 334). 
14 See for example F. Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth-Century 
Florence (Princeton, NJ, 1965) and  Q. Skinner, Machiavelli: a very short introduction (Oxford, 
2000). 
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wanted to say and ‘had to disguise his love of liberty’. The Prince, therefore, should be 
interpreted according to its own hidden message, and read upside down. This argument had 
previously been made by several apologists for Machiavelli, who had contributed to the 
establishment of the Republican tradition.15 The Prince does not contain the real thought of 
Machiavelli.  Because it was written under the yoke of the Medici, it is in fact the opposite of 
what Machiavelli really thinks,.  
Thus Rousseau seems to fluctuate between two opposite understandings, both 
relating to Machiavelli’s teaching, as in some sense all the aforementioned scholars suggest. 
The problem though, that in my view they fail to indicate, is that Rousseau himself offers 
interesting clues to a different interpretation of both Machiavelli’s thought and his own 
apparently contradictory argument. In fact, he adds that ‘the contrast between the maxims of 
his book The Prince and those of his Discourses […] and of his History of Florence shows that this 
profound political theorist has until now had only superficial or corrupt readers’.  Although 
unjust toward many readers who corageously worked to outline the Republican 
interpretation of Machiavelli, Rousseau’s remarks sound interesting from my point of view. 
Not so much because he sets aside The Prince from the other works, but rather insofar as he 
joins the Discourses and the Florentine Histories, whose separation is on the contrary essential to 
maintain what modern scholars generally maintain, namely the difference between good and 
bad conflicts, between parties and factions, between Rome and Florence. Implicitly, but 
vigorously, Rousseau is suggesting a different reading of Machiavelli, as well as an 
understanding of the Florentine that is deeper than that claimed by his modern interpreters. 
                                                 
15 This interpretation was developed as early as the 16th century, for example by Alberico 
Gentili in England, and by Louis Le Roy in France. See A. Gentili, De legationibus libri tres 
[1585] (New York, 1924), vol. 2, p. 156, and L. Le Roy, Les politiques d’Aristote (Paris, 1599). 
On Machiavelli’s heritage in the early modern European thought see G. Procacci, Machiavelli 
nella cultura europea dell’età moderna (Bari-Roma, 1995). 
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Therefore, if we follow a different interpretation of Machiavelli himself, a less ambiguous 
image of Rousseau’s reading can be formulated. 
Scholars have tended to read Machiavelli’s praise for social conflict through the 
opposition between parties and factions, as well as the related opposition between political 
vs economic conflicts. Whereas the former are supposedly moderate, can be 
institutionalised, and can produce good laws for the sake of the common good, the latter are 
supposedly violent and extreme, cannot be institutionalised, and lead to the corruption and 
decadence of the republic. Within the former, only political honours are at stake, while the 
latter are mainly focused around wealth. This opposition becomes particularly evident in the 
Florentine Histories, where Machiavelli supposedly condemns the factional spirit of the 
Florentine politics, opposing it to the virtue of Rome.16  
However, in my view,  a closer analysis of Machiavelli’s works allows us to reject this 
opposition. Although sketched in the first chapters of The Discourses, the contrast between 
moderate and political conflicts on the one hand and violent and economic conflicts on the 
other, is already dismissed by Machiavelli himself in the later chapters of The Discourses, and 
then more pointedly in the Florentine Histories. Machiavelli is more and more interested in 
showing how politics and economics cannot be separated, and that in fact Florence is the 
paradigm  of the concrete possibility of transformation, precisely for the very nature and 
intensity of its own conflicts. As Machiavelli clearly states in chapter III,1 of the Florentine 
Histories, the conflicts in Florence ‘brought the city to a wonderful equality’.17 Although 
‘injurious and injust’, the desires of the Florentine people brought the city to ‘the point that 
                                                 
16 For this interpretation see for example G. Sasso, Niccolò Machiavelli (Bologna, 1993) and G. 
Inglese, Machiavelli: l’arte dello Stato, la cognizione delle storie (Roma, 2006). 
17 FH III,1 
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it could easily have been reordered in any form of government by a wise lawgiver’. The 
opposition between the two kind of conflicts is therefore not convincing.  
Now, what happen if we read Rousseau’s ambiguous interpretation of Machiavelli 
not through the eyes of the traditional canonic explanation of Machiavelli’s theory of 
conflict, but rather following this less orthodox interpretation? I think that Rousseau’s 
interpretation itself, in its joining the Discourses and the Florentine Histories and opposing them 
to The Prince in one of the key passages of the Social Contract, suggests the logic of this 
hypothesis. My thesis is that this reading throws a new light not only on Machiavelli, but also 
on Rousseau. I am not claiming that all the inconsistencies can be stripped away from his use 
of Machiavelli. In fact, Rousseau consciously suggests the necessity of an ambivalent 
treatment of Machiavelli’s inconvenient position.18 However, these puzzling inconsistencies 
can be more deeply understood and more clearly explained. Moreover, Rousseau’s ambiguity 
on Machiavelli’s conflictual theory mainly derives, in my view, from a tension that is internal 
to Rousseau’s argument itself. And, in fact, it contributes to making this tension even 
sharper.19 The analysis needs to be carried out on Rousseau’s text itself, both when he quotes 
                                                 
18 Rousseau has good words only for Machiavelli and the Marquis d’Argenson in the Social 
Contract. The reader who is familiar with the marquis’ writings, though, knows that in the 
Lettres juives he boldly states that if he were a monarch, he would order the burning of the 
works of Machiavelli since he seeks to enslave truth to interest. See R. Shackleton, 
‘Montesquieu and Machiavelli: a Reappraisal’, Comparative Literature Studies, I (1964), pp. 1-13. 
19 I consciously employ this term in order to avoid any suggestion that Rousseau’s argument 
is ‘contradictory’. There is no contradiction in Rousseau’s thought, but rather a tension, 
whose manifestation can be seen by following the development of his work. Something 
similar is at the heart of the interpretation by the Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser, who 
heavily employs the notion of multiple décalages in Rousseau’s thought. See L. Althusser, 
‘L’impensé de Jean-Jacques Rousseau’, Cahiers pour l’analyse, VIII (1967), pp. 5-42, en. trans. 
Montesquieu, Rousseau, Marx: Politics and History (London, 1972), pp. 111-60. Here, though, 
décalage is translated by ‘discrepancy’. I think that the choice that better reflects Rousseau’s 
concept would have been ‘deviation’. 
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Machiavelli and when he develops the core of his theory in the Social Contract, namely the 
theory of the general will.20  
Let’s start from the famous text on the general will in chapter II,3. Rousseau has in 
mind a mathematical model to describe how the general will has to be determined: 
 
There is often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the general will. 
The latter considers only the general interest, whereas the former considers private 
interest and is merely the sum of private wills. But remove from these same wills the 
pluses and the minuses that destroy each other,21 and what remains as the sum of the 
differences is the general will.22 
 
The mathematical metaphor surrounding the process of artificial construction and 
‘calculation’ of the general will, namely the will of the sovereign, points to a powerful set of 
ideas, very well established in the culture of the time, and to the widely shared scientific 
approach to social sciences (Rousseau is certainly influenced by Leibniz and Spinoza, as well 
as Pascal, Malebranche and Leibniz).23 Yet it should not hide under the veil of a rigorous 
                                                 
20 On the general will, see P. Riley The General Will before Rousseau: the Transformation of the 
Divine into the Civic (Princeton, NJ, 1986). Although Riley’s discussion of the place of 
Machiavelli in Rousseau’s philosophy does not go into depth, his conclusion is that 
Rousseau’s general will includes a panoply of authors and ideas inherited from the past, 
including Machiavelli’s civic virtù. 
21 Here Rousseau puts his footnote on d’Argenson: ‘Each interest, says the Marquis 
d’Argenson, has different principles. The accord of two private interests is formed in 
opposition to that of a third. He could have added that the accord of all the interests is 
found in opposition to that of each. If there were no different interests, the common 
interest, which would never encounter any obstacle, would scarcely be felt. Everything 
would proceed on its own and politics would cease being an art’. 
22 SC II,3. 
23 In a clear Spinozist tone, Rousseau compares ‘le grand problème en politique à celui de la 
quadrature du cercle en géométrie et à celui des longitudes en astronomie’ in his Letter to 
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constructivism or mathematic precision an implicit tension between what I would call a 
positivistic moment and a jusnaturalistic moment. 
The positivistic moment is what makes possible for Rousseau the articulation among 
different types of will, and the supremacy of the general will over them all. Individuals can 
have a private will, contrary to or different from the general will. They can have a private 
interest totally different from the common interest. The opposite, though, cannot be said, 
insofar as the sovereign ‘neither has nor could have an interest contrary to [that of private 
individuals]’. This asymmetrical relationship between the many and the one makes the 
sovereign ‘perfect’ by definition, no matter what it does or says or thinks. As Rousseau 
boldly states: ‘the sovereign, by the mere fact that it exists, is always all that it should be’.24 
The tension, though, in my view emerges from the fact that the sovereign does not 
pre-exist the individual. The ‘multitude’ becomes the sovereign by and through the act of 
calculation of the general will. The general will is therefore not the premise, but rather the 
promise of the union. Moreover, it does not exist once and for all (as it does for 
Hobbesthrough the mechanism of representation, which is an absurdity for Rousseau), but it 
must be re-calculated over and over again. Nor does it exist through the mediation of a 
‘trust’ (as for Locke, whose delegation of the legislative power to the sovereign is explicitly 
rejected by Rousseau). The unification of the multitude in the body of the sovereign must be 
constantly reiterated for Rousseau in the process of ‘deliberation’, which corresponds to the 
actual exercise of the people’s will. And this introduces a further dimension within 
Rousseau’s argument, one that is clearly jusnaturalistic insofar as a higher model of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Mirabeau dated 26th July 1767, in Lettres philosophiques, ed. H. Gouhier (Paris, 1974), p. 167. 
On Spinoza and Rousseau see R. Derathé, Jean-Jacques Rousseau et la science politique de son temps 
(Paris, 1950) and P. Vernière, Spinoza et la pensée française avant la révolution (Paris, 1954). 
24 SC I,7. 
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perfection needs to be constantly and repeatedly considered. This is where Rousseau decides 
to confront Machiavelli’s argument: 
 
If, when a sufficiently informed people25 deliberates, the citizens were to have no 
communication among themselves, the general will would always result from the 
large number of small differences, and the deliberation would always be good. But 
when intrigues and partial associations come into being at the expense of the large 
association [the] result […] is less general. […] For the general will to be well 
articulated, it is therefore important that there should be no partial society in the 
state and that each citizen make up his own mind alone.26 
 
The calculation of the general will should happen in a solitary and isolated 
dimension, where every individual is alone, facing rather than producing the general will.27 
But if it is so, the promise becomes a premise once again, and the general will necessarily 
                                                 
25 ‘Populace’ in Cress’s translation, p. 156, but peuple in Rousseau. For that reason  I modify 
Cress’s text here, following both F. Watkins’s text, included in Rousseau, Political Writings 
(Edinburgh, 1953), p. 28 and J.R. Bush, R.D. Masters, and C. Kelly  in their translation and 
edition included in The Collected Writings of Rousseau, vol. 4, (Hanover and London, 1994), p. 
147. The question is of course of major importance, insofar as the use of ‘populace’ masks 
Rousseau’s consciously ambiguous use of peuple and pushes him, on the contrary, towards 
the natural law theorists à la Hobbes and their opposition between the populus and the 
multitudo. 
26 SC II,3. The last sentence in the original French is ‘chaque citoyen n’opine que d’après lui’. 
Bush, Masters, and Kelly opt for ‘each citizen gives only his own opinion’, while Watkins 
translates it as ‘each citizen should have personal opinions only’. Although the text is open 
enough for interpretation, I think that, in this case, Cress’s translation better reflects 
Rousseau’s spirit by stressing the solitude of the dimension in which the decision has to take 
place, as Rousseau himself makes clear at the beginning of the passage: ‘si […] les citoyens 
n’avaient aucune communication entre eux […]’.   
27 In the same way that a people should not have prejudices or be isolated from foreigners, in 
their ‘simplicity of nature’. See J.N. Shklar, Men and Citizens: a Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory 
(Cambridge, MA, 1969), p. 170. 
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pre-exists the process of its production, in the same way that the final cause pre-exists the 
entire causal process that leads toward it. The general will has precisely to be seen, in my 
view, as the final cause of the will of the many qua the many. It is intended to be realised, by 
Rousseau himself, through a passage from potentiality to actuality. 
Later on, he will more clearly explain this passage to actuality by saying that not only 
is obedience  due to any law, but also the consent must be given 
 
to all the laws, even to those that pass in spite of [one’s own] opposition […]. When 
a law is proposed in the people’s assembly, what is asked of them is not precisely 
whether they approve or reject, but whether or not it conforms to the general will 
that is theirs. Each man, in giving his vote, states his opinion on this matter, and the 
declaration of the general will is drawn from the counting of votes. When, therefore, 
the opinion contrary to mine prevails, this proves merely that I was in error, and that 
what I took to be the general will was not so.28 
 
One could try to solve the tension by saying that, vis-à-vis the sovereign, only 
individual wills exist, while vis-à-vis individuals, only the general will (or at least the idea of 
the general will) exists.29 The fact remains that the process of calculation, whatever its nature 
is and however it is performed, must be checked and validated by its correspondence to an 
                                                 
28 SC IV,2. 
29 It can be argued, as H. Arendt does in On Revolution, that this tension does not resolve the 
problem, but rather displaces it from the social to the anthropological dimension. J. Charvet, 
The Social Problem in the Philosophy of Rousseau (Cambridge, 1974), p. 99, maintains for example 
that ‘Rousseau’s solution to his social problem would produce an internal conflict within 
each man between [the moral will] and [the particular will]’. A conflict that finds its 
metaphysical expression in the profession of faith by a Savoyard vicar. Although focusing 
largely on social conflict, and stressing the ‘obscurity’ of Rousseau’s theory (p. 134), Charvet 
does not discuss the role played by Machiavelli. 
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idea that has a higher perfection that is simultaneously ontological and political. On the one 
hand, Rousseau establishes the ontological primacy of the sovereign (the people) vis-à-vis 
every other subject (the multitude, the individual, the government, the partial associations), 
by claiming its absolute perfection. On the other hand the process of calculation somehow 
imposes the confrontation of the multiplicity of possible decisions (all of them imperfect by 
definition) not among themselves, but rather immediately with the general will. The truth 
and perfection of the general will, therefore, ends up turning upside-down its own process of 
production and appropriating its actual exercise via a kind of teleological movement. 
One can also argue that this problem arises from the tension between the descriptive 
moment of reality (i.e. partial societies exist, and they tend to obscure and suffocate the 
general will) and the normative moment of the project (i.e. partial societies must be crushed, 
so that the general will can emerge). The truth and perfection of the general will, in any case, 
is not merely an hypothesis for Rousseau. It represents his strongest idealistic belief in its 
own existence, above and beyond real societies: by dismissing any mythical or ideological 
treatment of the general will, Rousseau makes it, in some way, more real than reality itself. 
Is there any space for social and political conflict within this ideological and 
teleological process? It doesn’t seem so. Rousseau’s condemnation of factions and partial 
associations is therefore not astonishing. What is astonishing and puzzling, however, is that 
he quotes Machiavelli precisely to support his idea of calculation of the general will. A more 
thoughtful consideration of the main passages where the Florentine’s opinion on conflicts is 
summoned, in II,3 and in III,9 of the Social Contract, is therefore needed. Scholars have not 
stressed the different style of the quotation. While the first  is a simple transcription of 
Machiavelli’s text, the second  is a long and articulate comment. 
 17 
‘For the general will to be well articulated – Rousseau says – it is […] important that 
there should be no partial society in the State and that each citizen make up his own mind 
alone’. The State, therefore, must be united. And then he adds, in Italian, the quotation from 
Florentine Histories VII: ‘It is true that some divisions are harmful to republics and some are 
helpful. Those are harmful that are accompanied by sects and partisans; those are helpful 
that are maintained without sects and partisans. Thus, since a founder of a republic cannot 
provide that there be no enmities in it, he has to provide at least that there not be sects’.30 A 
curious quotation, without any comment, given the fact that 1) Machiavelli’s text does not 
support Rousseau’s argument, at least not entirely, and that 2) Rousseau omits what 
Machiavelli clearly states immediately before the passage quoted, namely that ‘those who 
hope that a republic can be united are very much deceived in this hope’. 
How are we supposed to read this quotation that Rousseau does not comment 
upon? Two options are possible: either 1) Machiavelli has to be read turned upside down.31 
In this case, there  does not in fact exist any difference between positive and negative 
divisions. This in turn means that Rousseau has perfectly understood Machiavelli (according 
to my own thesis), but  also that his use of Machiavelli is contradictory, because whereas 
Machiavelli’s text would mean that all divisions are positive, Rousseau wants to suggest that 
none of them is; or 2) because these are the Florentine Histories, it is in fact true that some 
                                                 
30 FH VII,1. 
31 As we know, Rousseau is well aware of the political conditions under which Machiavelli 
was writing and his relationship with his patrons. Book VII of the Florentine Histories deals 
with the second half of the 15th century, and a period when the Medici influence on 
Florentine politics is becoming extremely heavy. Rousseau is also aware that the more the 
historical account approaches this period, the more Machiavelli must be careful, balancing 
his own political standing, the historical truth, and the fact that the work itself is supposed to 
bring him back to the public sphere and the political activity, unconditionally ruled, by this 
time, by the Medici family. Should the last part of the Florentine Histories be read in the same 
way that The Prince should be read? 
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divisions are positive, and others are negative, but the quotation is still problematic because 
whereas Machiavelli’s text would mean that at least some divisions are positive, and people 
are deceived when they hope that a republic can be united, Rousseau still wants to suggest 
that none of them is, and that union is clearly the aim and target of a republic. 
I think that the inconsistency can be at least partially solved by reading the second 
key passage, chapter III,9 on ‘the Signs of a Good Government’. In a footnote, Rousseau 
writes that  
 
riots and civil wars may greatly disturb the leaders, but they are not the true 
misfortunes of the people, who may even have a reprieve while people argue over 
who will tyrannize them. It is their permanent condition that causes real periods of 
prosperity or calamity. It is when everything remains crushed under the yoke that 
everything decays. It is then that the leaders destroy them at will, where they bring about 
solitude they call it peace [Tacitus, Agricola, 31].32 
 
If, on the one hand, a bitter irony suffuses the whole passage and the idea that 
people argue over who will tyrannize them, on the other hand the rest of the footnote 
stresses without ambiguity the link between freedom and conflict. Rousseau mentions the 
Fronde, ancient Greece, and then the authority, once again, of Machiavelli: 
 
It seemed, says Machiavelli, that in the midst of murders, proscriptions, and civil 
wars, our republic became more powerful; the virtue of its citizens, their mores, and 
their independence did more to reinforce it than all its dissensions did to weaken it. 
                                                 
32 SC III,9, footnote. 
 19 
A little agitation gives strength to souls, and what truly brings about prosperity for 
the species is not so much peace as liberty.33 
 
The message seems clear: liberty – and therefore conflict – rather than peace leads to 
prosperity.. And yet the quotation must be carefully scrutinised: ‘our republic’, Machiavelli 
says. Which republic is Rousseau thinking about? And which work of Machiavelli is he 
referring to here? It cannot be ‘our’ Rome, because in the Discourses Machiavelli maintains 
precisely the opposite: whereas Rousseau mentions murders, proscriptions, and civil wars, 
Machiavelli writes that ‘the tumults of Rome rarely engendered exile and very rarely blood. 
[This devided Republic] sent no more than eight or ten citizens into exile because of its 
differences, and killed very few of them’.34 Thus it must be ‘our’ republic in the proper sense, 
i.e. Florence. But then the reading that I am suggesting of Machiavelli is confirmed once 
again, because notwithstanding the many murders, proscriptions, and civil wars – or rather 
because of them – Florence was brought to the possibility of freedom, but  certainly not to 
peace and harmony. Rousseau, once again, has perfectly understood Machiavelli, but he 
keeps using him in an apparently contradictory way to support his own thesis. 
Where does the contradiction come from? In other words, what is the blind spot of 
Rousseau’s political theory that prevents him from either entirely abandoning the reference 
                                                 
33 Ivi. G. Namer, Rousseau sociologue de la connaissance (Paris, 1978), claims that Rousseau targets 
here Voltaire and his apology for peace. And yet Rousseau would not have the courage to 
entirely follow Machiavelli on his own ground: ‘Rousseau est tenté par la thèse que 
Machiavel énonce cruement dans les Discorsi, suivant la quelle la guerre civile peut être une 
condition de la démocratie; […] mais, si la nostalgie de la violence est constante, l’inhibition 
est permanente devant l’émeute et la revolution; ce n’est donc pas un hasard, si, au lieu du 
texte de Machiavel qu’il connaît, il donne une version transformée […]’ (p. 195). However, 
Namer neither discusses Rousseau’s choice, nor explains why this ‘modified version’ is 
relevant to it. 
34 D I,4. 
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to Machiavelli or unconditionally adhering to his own theory? To grasp this blind spot, in my 
view, two things are necessary: a broader approach to Rousseau’s political thought, beyond 
the analysis of the actual quotations of Machiavelli, as well as a wider reference to the 
political sensibilities of the period. 
The first thing to be considered here is the theme of ‘equality’. Rousseau declares 
that ‘liberty’ and not necessarily ‘peace’ brings about prosperity, and then he refers to 
Machiavelli on Florence. Now, Florence’s liberty and prosperity was due, for Machiavelli, to 
the fact that the people had progressively destroyed the ancient nobility and established a 
‘wonderful equality’, namely an economic situation more favorable to a popular government 
and to freedom, a position  Machiavelli consistently holds throughout his intellectual 
production. Specifically in this passage, Machiavelli is explicitly linking freedom and equality, 
through social conflict. 
A passage in the Observations on the King of Poland’s response must be quoted here. 
For Rousseau, once a people has been corrupted, it is impossible to bring it back to the 
ancient virtue, by means, for example, of more equality: ‘You would try in vain to destroy 
the sources of evil. You would take away in vain the nourishment of vanity, idleness, and 
luxury. You would even return men in vain to that first equality, preserver of innocence and 
source of all virtue. Their hearts once spoiled will be so forever. There is no remedy short of 
some great revolution – almost as much to be feared as the evil it might cure – and which is 
blameworthy to desire and impossible to foresee.35 Engaging with the theme of corruption, 
in chapter I,17 of the Discourses, Machiavelli asserts on the contrary that ‘corruption and [a] 
                                                 
35 Observations de Jean-Jacques Rousseau de Genève sur la réponse qui a été faite à son Discours (1751), 
en. trans. Observations by Jean-Jacques Rousseau of Geneva, in The Collected Writings of Rousseau, vol. 
2, Discourse on the Sciences and Arts (first Discourse) and Polemics, ed. by R.D. Masters and C. Kelly 
(Hanover and London, 1992), p. 53. This does not mean, of course, that human nature can 
not be improved, ‘at least in principle’, as R. Wokler, Rousseau (Oxford, 1995), puts it. 
 21 
slight aptitude for free life arise from an inequality that is in [the] city; and if one wishes to 
make it equal, it is necessary to use the greatest extraordinary means, which few know how 
or wish to use’.36 The two texts point in a different direction: whereas for Machiavelli it is 
possible and necessary – although difficult – to recover the ancient virtue by restoring 
equality, for Rousseau, even if it were possible, it would be useless and dangerous. At stake 
here, in both cases, are the political effects of ‘economic equality’ and how they relate to 
conflict.37 
This points us to another work where Rousseau does not mention Machiavelli. Yet 
his implicit presence is so strong that, in my view, it can be considered Rousseau’s  most 
Machiavellian text. In part II of the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, Rousseau develops his 
seminal argument on the introduction of private property and the consequent decline of the 
human species. Here, in an extremely powerful passage, he describes the feelings of those 
who stole what was previously common, and called it ‘property’. They now fear the 
‘perpetual war’ in which they can lose what they have acquired: 
 
regardless of the light in which they try to place their usurpations, they knew full well 
that they were established on nothing but a precarious and abusive right, and that 
having been acquired merely by force, force might take them away from them 
without their having any reason to complain.38 
 
                                                 
36 D I,17. Both Cucchi and Levy had already pointed out the similarity with Machiavelli’s 
text. However, they do not mention the fact that, although the topic is similar, Machiavelli’s 
and Rousseau’s arguments go in opposite directions. 
37 Instead of a cleavage between the two authors, Jourdan, ‘Le Machiavel de Rousseau’, sees 
here a convergence between them, in the name of ‘moderation’ and ‘civil liberty’, which goes 
hand in hand with a certain form of equality. 
38 DOI, II, p. 69. 
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Their situation is miserable. Incapable of uniting against the poor, the rich have a 
wonderful idea and they invent ‘the most thought-out project that ever entered the human 
mind’, namely the idea of a ‘common good’ and a common interest between exploited and 
exploiters: 
 
‘Let us unite,’ [they say], ‘in order to protect the weak from the oppression […] and 
assure everyone of possessing what belongs to him. Let us institute rules of justice 
and peace to which all will be obliged to conform. […] instead of turning our forces 
against ourselves, let us gather them into one supreme power that governs us 
according to wise laws, that protects and defends all the members of the association, 
repulses common enemies, and maintains us in an eternal concord.’39 
 
The rich are scared and isolated, and by way of this amazing invention, the ‘common 
good,’ they are able to transform their weakness into their force. This intense passage of the 
Discouse on the Origin of Inequality unambiguosly echoes Machiavelli’s strongest pages from 
book III of the Florentine Histories, where the ideology of concord, social harmony, and the 
imposture of a ‘common good’ is boldly swept away.40 When he reconstructs the Tumult of 
the Ciompi of 1378, Machiavelli stages a series of fictional dialogues opposing the discourse 
of the Gonfalonier Luigi Guicciardini to that of an anonymous leader of the plebeian rebels. 
The political climate is similar to the fictional situation staged by Rousseau: the Grandi are 
                                                 
39 Ivi. 
40 G. Namer, Rousseau, p. 206, claims that it is only by explicitly denouncing the anti-popular 
politics of the aristocracy that Rousseau is able to make explicit what remains implicit in 
Machiavelli, namely the indirect revelation about the art of the prince in deceiving the people 
and distracting it from the real problems of politics by making unnecessary wars. In fact, 
Rousseau can explicitly read this position in Machiavelli’s Florentine Histories. This makes his 
choice of quoting from this book even more significant.  
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scared and divided, and they try to praise union.41 Machiavelli reveals the hidden and dark 
side of the common good: no common ground is possible between exploiters and exploited 
until the causes of exploitation are removed: 
 
if you observe the mode of proceeding of men, you will see that all those who come 
to great riches and great power have obtained them either by fraud or by force; and 
afterwards, to hide the ugliness of acquisition, they make it decent by applying the 
false title of earnings to things they have usurped by deceit or by violence.42 
 
The Ciompi orator represents a scandal in the history of political thought. His 
discourse is a direct and forthright acknowledgment that politics is primarily an assertion of 
force. It is the discovery that force can only be asserted through violence that then gives 
form to the law. It is the recognition that fraud is the only means to acquire riches and 
power, and that violence and usurpation are the hidden ground of every ‘acquisition’, that 
those who come to power later ‘make decent’ by calling them ‘earnings.’ There is no such 
thing as honest earnings, in the same way that there can  be no such thing as the ‘common’ 
good. 
                                                 
41 FH III,11: ‘What do you get out of your disunion other than servitude? Or of the goods 
that you have stolen or would steal from us other than poverty? For those are the things 
that, with our industry, nourish the whole city; and if it is despoiled of them, they cannot 
nourish it; and those who will seize them, as things ills acquired, will not know how to 
preserve them: for this, hunger and poverty will come to the city. These Signori and I 
command you, and if decency permits we prey you to still your spirits for once and be 
content to rest quietly with the things that have been ordered through us, and if ever you 
wish something new, be pleased to ask for it with civility and not with tumult and arms. For 
if they are decent things, you will always be granted them, and you will not give occasion to 
wicked men, at your charge and to your cost, to ruin your fatherland on your shoulders’. 
42 FH III,13. 
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It seems to me that Rousseau has meditated deeply on Machiavelli’s strongest 
conclusions about social conflict, its origins, and the link between equality and liberty.43 
Rousseau echoes Machiavelli’s most radical pages, as well as his most ‘plebeian’ accents, in 
the Discourse on the Origins of Inequality.44 He seeks inspiration in Machiavelli against the 
philosophes, the Encyclopédistes, and the aristocratic culture within which they too easily tend to 
find accomodating compromises. 
 When he comes to the Social Contract, though, the tone changes dramatically. This is 
no longer  the time for revealing the hidden side of politics. This is not the time for a 
destructive criticism, but rather for a constituent theory.45 And this change in the tone will 
happen, as we know, precisely under the flag of the absolute unity and harmony within the 
general will. Echoing once again a teleological language, the common good, previously 
denounced as a subterfuge of the rich, becomes nothing less than the ‘end’ of the institution 
of the state: ‘The first and most important consequence of the principles established above is 
that only the general will can direct the forces of the state according to the end [la fin] for 
which it was instituted, which is the common good’.46  
The political programme of the Social Contract itself refers to harmony and unity 
above all, and it has an extraordinary resemblance to the fictional speech of the rich quoted 
above: ‘Find a form of association which defends and protects with all common forces the 
person and goods of each associate, and by means of which each one, while uniting with all, 
                                                 
43 On this point, see K.D. Schulz, Rousseaus Eigentumskonzeption. Eine Studie zur Entwicklung der 
bürgerlichen Staatstheorie (Frankfurt am Main, 1980). 
44 This is also the conclusion of G. Namer, Rousseau, pp. 47-8: ‘Il nous semble donc qu’en 
partant de la lutte des classes, et non de la guerre interindividuelle, le pacte social du second 
discours […] se rapproche […] de Machiavel, dans la mesure, où, on le sait, l’auteur des 
Discours sur Tite-Live fonde toute la vie politique sur la lutte de la noblesse et du peuple’. 
45 On the artificial construction of the common good as the ‘crucial question’ of Rousseau’s 
Social Contract, see J. Charvet, The Social Problem. 
46 SC II,1. 
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nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before.47 Equality does not mean, as it 
did for Machiavelli, the destruction of the rich and the reappropriation of richness by the 
many.48 It means, on the contrary, moderation and primacy of the middle class over the 
extremes in the name, once again, of the common good.49 
But in order to neutralise the radicality of Machiavelli’s thought, Rousseau has to 
manipulate Machiavelli’s argument even further. Next to the quotation of Machiavelli in 
Social Contract II,3, where he blames partial societies, Rousseau adds another puzzling 
reference by declaring that ‘such was the unique and sublime institution of the great 
Lycurgus’.50 Although the importance of Lycurgus is widely recognised, scholars does not 
have fully stressed all the implications of referring to him in this context: how does 
Rousseau’s mentioning of the mythical Spartan legislator sound next to Machiavelli’s name? 
The classical tradition speaks about Lycurgus as the legislator who imposes equality 
in Sparta by redistributing lands. Although Herodotus and Thucydides do not particularly 
                                                 
47 See SC I,6. 
48 Praising the historical role played by Rousseau in the formation of Scientific socialism, 
Marxist philosopher Galvano Della Volpe also maintains that the dialectic between the 
Discours and the Social Contract develops around a fundamental difference concerning the 
issue of equality and inequality. ‘Mentre il Contrat social, per la sua fondamentale ispirazione 
etico-politica gisnaturalistica […] non poteva offrire immediatamente che una soluzione 
egualitaria borghese del problema del Discours […] la portata storico-problematica del 
Discours, invece, del suo criterio di un egualitarismo mediatore di persone […] trascende non solo 
ogni soluzione egualitaria democratico-borghese ma persino democratico-socialista […] per 
risolversi – postulando un nuovo piano storico – nella futura realizzazione egualitaria del 
comunismo scientifico’. See G. Della Volpe, Rousseau e Marx (Roma, 1957), pp. 73-4. For a 
different Marxist interpretation, see A. Illuminati, J.-J. Rousseau e la fondazione dei valori borghesi 
(Milano, 1977). 
49 See, for example, SC II,11, footnote: ‘Do you […] want to give constancy to the State? 
Bring the extremes as close together as possible. Tolerate neither rich men nor beggars. 
These two estates, which are naturally inseparable, are equally fatal to the common good. 
From the one come the fomenters of tyranny, and from the other the tyrants. It is always 
between them that public liberty becomes a matter of commerce. The one buys it and the 
other sells it’. 
50 SC II,3. 
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stress this aspect in the biography of the mythical Lycurgus,51 Plutarch very clearly does, thus 
becoming the main source and inspiration for the men of the French revolution: when the 
Convention was set at the Tuileries on the 10th May 1793, a bust of Lycurgus was placed on 
the orator’s tribune. ‘Let’s ask Lycurgus – says the deputy Brival the following day in his 
speech – how he made the Spartans the most virtuous and wise people of Greece, and he 
will answer that he succeeded by making all the citizens equal’.52 Curiously enough, Rousseau 
consciously avoids the reference to Plutarch and the egalitarian character of Lycurgus’ 
legislation.53 He certainly avoids the reference to what he could read in Machiavelli himself, 
i.e. that ‘Lycurgus with his laws made more equality of belongings in Sparta and less equality 
of rank’.54 Once again, then, Rousseau is trying to undermine the most radical conclusions of 
Machiavelli on the link between political freedom, economic equality, and social conflict. 
Besides the use of a common Republican vocabulary and the apparently similar use 
of the same categories, if Rousseau feels entitled to use Machiavelli’s conflictual argument to 
support his own non-conflictual theory, he probably has something at least slightly different 
in mind when he talks about social and political conflicts. The historical perspective, here, 
helps a great deal. It was not uncommon, in the 18th century, to think about conflict as an 
element producing a certain kind of union rather than disunion, by thinking about societies 
and their free economic forces as opposed to the State and the constraints imposed by their 
political dynamics. 
                                                 
51 Herodotus, I,65, and Thucydides, I,18,1. 
52 See C. Mosse, ‘Due miti politici: Licurgo e Solone’, in S. Settis (a cura di), I Greci: Storia, 
cultura, arte, società (Torino, 1996), II, p. 1325 and also C. Mosse, L’Antiquité dans la Révolution 
française (Paris, 1989). 
53 Especially if we have to take seriously Rousseau’s tribute to the ‘excellence’ of Plutarch in 
his capacity at grasping heroes’ characters through the details of their lives. See Emile, IV. 
Yet in his Parallèles entre les deux républiques de Sparte et de Rome (1751-53), for example, 
Rousseau himself never gives details on the character and nature of Lycurgus’ laws. 
54 D I,6. 
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A relevant exemple of this strategy is the Anti-Machiavel of Frederic II, in which the 
Prussian sovereign and friend to Voltaire, attempts to tame Machiavelli’s theory of conflict 
in this same way. Although ‘nothing contributes better to the force of a monarchy than the 
intimate and inseparable union of all his members’, yet ‘republics must somehow entertain 
some form of jealousy among their members, because if the parties do not watch out over 
each other, the form of government becomes a monarchy’.55 Frederic’s preference is of 
course not for this form of government, and yet he suggests that powers should watch over 
each other in the republics, echoing a fundamental principle of modern Liberal 
constitutionalism.  
We find a similar idea in Montesquieu’s attempt to neutralise the extreme theories of 
Machiavelli. In the Considerations on the Causes of the Grandeur and Decadence of the Romans (1734), 
for example, Montesquieu argues the necessity of tolerating the conflicts between the plebs 
and the senate, in order to allow men to vent the ambitions typical of human nature. In his 
masterpiece The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu goes much further, developing his original 
reading of Machiavelli’s theory and arguing for the institutionalisation and 
constitutionalisation of conflicts within the modern logic of a reciprocal control of powers 
within the State. The Liberal paradigm developed by Montesquieu is in my view the most 
powerful attempt to neutralise Machiavelli’s assumptions56.  
This is the background against which Rousseau must make his own choice. He is 
well aware of the extreme character of Machiavelli’s positions, and how they interpellate his 
own theory. He is aware of the historical context and the current debate surrounding the 
                                                 
55 Frederic II, ‘L’Anti-Machiavel’, XX, p. 95. 
56 Rather than only moderate them, as suggested by Paul Carrese, ‘The Machiavellian Spirit 
of Montesquieu’s Liberal Republic’, in Paul A. Rahe, Machiavelli’s Liberal Republican Legacy 
(Cambridge, 2006) pp. 121-42. 
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name  Machiavelli. He is also aware of the originality of his own theory, which has to 
contend with powerful alternative discourses: the more moderate positions of the philosophes 
– specifically, Liberal constitutionalism and the balance of powers endorsed by Montesquieu 
– on the one hand, and the enlightened absolutism represented by Frederic II and Voltaire 
on the other. Whereas the former had attempted to tame Machiavelli’s theory via the 
institutionalisation of conflicts, the latter had violently attacked him and his theory of 
conflicts. Both, though, shared the idea that some form of disunion could in fact be seen as a 
kind of union. 
Beyond the explicit references to Machiavelli, Rousseau touches upon this problem 
in several other parts of his work, when he actually tackles the problem of social conflict and 
of the turbulences of a republican way of life.57 The tensions within Rousseau’s discourse 
seem to arise whenever the necessity of the balance of powers clashes with his preference 
for an absolute supremacy of the legislative power. But even more important, as I tried to 
show above, those tensions emerge out of the ontological status of the sovereign power 
itself vis-à-vis the individuals who constitute it or, in other words, between the way the 
relationship between the many and the one is conceptualised. Machiavelli’s political theory 
proves to be the ultimate litmus test of Rousseau’s theory.  
When it comes to the discussion of the role played by conflict within the state, vis-à-
vis both Rousseau’s groundbreaking idea of the general will and the historical debate 
surrounding the name of Machiavelli, what is to be done? Should the name of Machiavelli be 
obliterated and hidden behind the condemnation of partial societies? This would mean, in 
practice, joining those condemning him, and missing the opportunity to contribute to his 
                                                 
57 M. Melzer, The Natural Goodness of Man: On the System of Rousseau’s Thought (Chicago and 
London, 1990), p. 210. 
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Republican revaluation. Should, on the contrary, the name of Machiavelli be mentioned? But 
if so, how? Doing so might bring to the surface the stark differences between Rousseau  and 
Machiavelli. The possibility of  considering disunion as a form of union, in the mood of the 
time, certainly helps him, and possibly contributes to make him feel these inconsistencies 
less important than they actually appear to us. 
The risk though, as I have illustrated above, is also to make more explicit the inner 
tensions characterising Rousseau’s theory itself, between a more radically egalitarian and 
destructive moment, based on the critique of private property, and a more moderate 
constituent moment, aiming at social harmony and the common good. Rousseau consciously 
decides to run this risk. The tension, in this sense, does not rise from Rousseau’s 
misunderstanding of Machiavelli. He repeatedly and consistently demonstrates a clear 
understanding of Machiavelli’s theory of conflict and of what is at stake in it. The tension 
arises, in my view, from the inner dialectic of Rousseau’s thought and its evolution, which is 
particularly clear between the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality and the Social Contract. 
Machiavelli openly claimed the inextricable convergence between freedom, equality, and 
conflict. There is clearly no space for the latter in the Social Contract. Therefore, whenever 
Rousseau tries to articulate the nexus between freedom and equality, the question of 
conflicts reemerges as a problem, precisely through the presence of Machiavelli. Rousseau 
decides to speak his name out loud, and by doing so, he leaves us with the task of taking a 
stand in this political and ideological Kampfplatz, concerning the role of conflicts and their 
relationship with order, freedom, and democracy. 
